

UPSC CIVIL SERVICES • MAINS GS PAPER III

Internal Security for UPSC

The complete GS Paper III internal security book: terrorism, J&K, the North-East, Left-Wing Extremism, borders and coasts, cyber security, money laundering and the security forces — every Mains PYQ from 2013 to 2026 with an expert approach, and banks of laws, schemes, committees and judgments. Updated to October 2026.

Compiled by Arvind KrS

32 chapters • 59 PYQs • 12 units • 209 diagrams



IN THIS BOOK

I	Foundations of Internal Security	II	Terrorism
III	Jammu and Kashmir	IV	North-East India
V	Left-Wing Extremism and Development	VI	Communal, Caste and Mob Violence
VII	Organised Crime, Trafficking and External Actors	VIII	Border and Coastal Security
IX	Cyber Security, Communication Networks and Media	X	Money Laundering and Economic Security
XI	Security Forces and Agencies	XII	Answer-Writing Resources



Internal Security for UPSC

Notes for UPSC Civil Services Mains General Studies Paper III

2027 Edition · Compiled October 2026 · Compiled by Arvind KrS

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Contents

UNIT I	Foundations of Internal Security	5
01	Internal Security: Concepts, Dimensions and India's Threat Landscape IN THIS SAMPLE	6
02	Internal Security Architecture: Institutions, Police and the New Criminal Laws	18
UNIT II	Terrorism	29
03	Terrorism: Concept, Types, Causes and New-Age Methods	30
04	Terrorism in India: Hinterland Modules, Patterns and Counter-Terrorism Strategy	41
05	Counter-Terrorism Laws and Institutions: UAPA, NSA, NIA and the Post-26/11 Architecture	52
06	Terror Financing, Narco-Terrorism and Counter-Measures	63
UNIT III	Jammu and Kashmir	74
07	Jammu and Kashmir: History, Article 370 and the 2019 Reorganisation	75
08	Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir: Proxy War, Pahalgam, Operation Sindoor and the Way Forward IN THIS SAMPLE	86
UNIT IV	North-East India	96
09	Insurgency in North-East India: Roots, Groups and Peace Accords	97
10	Manipur Conflict and Ethnic Fault Lines of the North-East	109
UNIT V	Left-Wing Extremism and Development	120
11	Left-Wing Extremism: Evolution, Ideology, Structure and Spread	121
12	Countering Left-Wing Extremism: Security, Development and the Road to a Naxal-Free India	132
13	Linkages between Development and the Spread of Extremism	143
UNIT VI	Communal, Caste and Mob Violence	154
14	Communalism and Communal Violence	155
15	Mob Violence, Lynching, Vigilantism and Regional, Linguistic and Caste Conflicts	166

UNIT VII	Organised Crime, Trafficking and External Actors	177
16	Organised Crime and Its Nexus with Terrorism	178
17	Trafficking, Illegal Migration and Refugees: Human, Drug and Arms Flows	189
18	Role of External State Actors: Pakistan, China and the Neighbourhood	200
19	Role of External Non-State Actors	211
UNIT VIII	Border and Coastal Security	222
20	Border Management: Principles, Challenges and India's Land Borders	223
21	Coastal and Maritime Security	235
UNIT IX	Cyber Security, Communication Networks and Media	246
22	Cyber Security: Threats, Attacks and Critical Information Infrastructure	247
23	India's Cyber Security Framework: Laws, Institutions and Strategy	259
24	Social Media, Fake News and Communication Networks as Security Challenges	271
25	Radicalisation and De-radicalisation: Pathways, Online Extremism and Community Resilience	282
UNIT X	Money Laundering and Economic Security	293
26	Money Laundering and Black Money: Process, Techniques and Effects	294
27	Prevention of Money Laundering: PMLA, FIU-IND, FATF and Global Cooperation	305
UNIT XI	Security Forces and Agencies	316
28	Armed Forces, Central Armed Police Forces and Paramilitary: Mandate and Reforms	317
29	Intelligence and Investigative Agencies: Mandate, Coordination and Reform	328
30	AFSPA and the Use of Armed Forces in Aid of Civil Power	339
UNIT XII	Answer-Writing Resources	350
31	Laws, Agencies and Schemes Bank	351
32	Committees, Reports and Judgments Bank	365

UNIT I

2 CHAPTERS

Foundations of Internal Security

What internal security means, how India's threats are inter-linked, and the institutions, police and criminal laws that answer them — the frame for every later chapter.

CHAPTERS

01	Internal Security: Concepts, Dimensions and India's Threat Landscape	6
02	Internal Security Architecture: Institutions, Police and the New Criminal Laws	18

TOPICS COVERED IN THIS UNIT

01 Internal Security: Concepts, Dimensions and India's Threat Landscape

Internal, External and National Security · The Constitutional Scheme · Why India Faces So Many Threats · The Threat Landscape in 2026 · Grey-Zone and New-Age Threats · How the Threats Interlock · Internal Security Policy: The Aspects · The National Security Strategy Debate · Limitations and the Way Forward

02 Internal Security Architecture: Institutions, Police and the New Criminal Laws

The Apex: CCS, NSC and the NSA · Higher Defence: CDS and Theatres · The Ministry of Home Affairs · The State Police Apparatus · Police Reform: Committees and Courts · Modernisation, Technology, Forensics · The New Criminal Laws · Security Provisions and the Critique · Centre-State Coordination · The Way Forward

INTERNAL SECURITY

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Internal Security: Concepts, Dimensions and India's Threat Landscape

In 2001, by the South Asia Terrorism Portal's count, 5,504 people died in terrorist and insurgent violence in India. In 2025 the figure was 657, and on 30 March 2026 the Union Home Minister told the Lok Sabha that India was free of Naxalism. In the same year citizens reported losing ₹22,495 crore to cyber fraud, and drones dropped heroin and pistols across the Punjab fence almost nightly. The old threats are receding; new ones arrive faster. This chapter lays out the ideas and the map that the rest of the book fills in.

SYLLABUS

PRELIMS

Current events of national and international importance

MAINS · GS PAPER III

Linkages between development and spread of extremism; Role of external state and non-state actors in creating challenges to internal security; Challenges to internal security through communication networks, role of media and social networking sites in internal security challenges, basics of cyber security; money-laundering and its prevention; Security challenges and their management in border areas - linkages of organized crime with terrorism; Various Security forces and agencies and their mandate

CONTENTS

01	Internal, External and National Security	02	The Constitutional Scheme
03	Why India Faces So Many Threats	04	The Threat Landscape in 2026
05	Grey-Zone and New-Age Threats	06	How the Threats Interlock
07	Internal Security Policy: The Aspects	08	The National Security Strategy Debate
09	Limitations and the Way Forward	10	Previous Year Questions

This chapter covers:

- internal, external, national and human security: what the terms mean;

- the constitutional division of responsibility and how it works;
- why India faces so many security challenges at once;
- the threat landscape of 2026, from the Line of Control to cyberspace;
- grey-zone threats and how the threats interlock;
- internal security policy, the national security strategy debate and the way forward.

Institutions, police reform and the new criminal laws are in Chapter 2; terrorism in Chapters 3–6; every theatre, border and domain named here has its own chapter later.

01 Internal, External and National Security


The idea is older than the modern State. Kautilya's *Arthashastra* sorted the dangers to a kingdom into four kinds: internal, external, internally aided external and externally aided internal. The last describes much of India's experience. **Internal security** is the maintenance of peace, order and the authority of the State within its borders: the work of the police, supported where needed by the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and in the last resort the Army, under the Ministry of Home Affairs. **External security** is protection against aggression by another State, the task of the armed forces under the Ministry of Defence. The line has blurred: a proxy war is an external threat fought inside the country, and a cyber intrusion crosses no border at all.

BASIS	EXTERNAL SECURITY	INTERNAL SECURITY
Source of threat	Another State's forces or policy	Groups and conditions inside the territory, often externally aided
What is at stake	Sovereignty, territory	Public order, the writ of the State, citizens' trust in government
Lead ministry	Defence; External Affairs	Home Affairs; State Home Departments
Lead instrument	Armed forces, diplomacy, deterrence	Police, CAPFs, intelligence, courts, development
Legal frame	International law, war powers	Constitution, criminal law, special laws (UAPA, NSA, AFSPA)

National security once meant only the preservation of the State, its territory, institutions and sovereignty from physical threats. It now takes in economic, energy, food and water security, cyber and space, health and climate, and the **human security** that the UNDP's Human Development Report of 1994 defined as freedom from fear and from want in seven fields, from food and health to community and political life. Its constituents follow: the rule of law, sovereignty defended against armed challenge, domestic peace, equality before law (Article 14), freedom from fear and fraternity.


What 'Security' Means: Four Nested Ideas

Law and order is the widest and lightest circle; national security the narrowest and gravest. Internal security sits between them and borrows from both.



Ram Manohar Lohia v State of Bihar (1966):
every breach of law is not a public-order problem,
and every public-order problem does not threaten the State.

KAUTILYA'S FOUR KINDS OF THREAT



NATIONAL SECURITY: WIDENING

TRADITIONAL CORE

- Territorial integrity and sovereignty
- Political institutions and the constitutional order
- Monopoly of legitimate force

NON-TRADITIONAL LAYERS

- Economic, energy, food and water security
- Cyber, space and critical infrastructure
- Health, climate and disaster resilience
- Human security (UNDP, 1994): freedom from fear and from want

Internal security: peace, order and the writ of the State inside its own borders

Fig. 1.1 From law and order to national security: the nested ideas, Kautilya's four categories of threat, and how the meaning of security has widened.

COMMON CONFUSION: LAW AND ORDER, PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY OF THE STATE

The three are **not** interchangeable. In *Ram Manohar Lohia v State of Bihar (1966)* the Supreme Court drew three concentric circles: **law and order** is the largest (any breach of law), **public order** the next (a disturbance of the even tempo of community life), and **security of the State** the smallest. The distinction decides which power applies: preventive detention for public order is a Concurrent subject, detention for the security of India is the Union's. **Every internal security problem is a public-order problem, but the reverse is not true.**

02 The Constitutional Scheme

The Constitution gives the first responsibility to the States and a duty of protection to the Union. **Public order** (Entry 1) and **police** (Entry 2) are in the State List, so the district superintendent, the State Director General of Police and the State intelligence branch are the front line. The Union's duty flows from **Article 355**: to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that its government is carried on in accordance with the Constitution. Entry **2A** of the Union List (**42nd Amendment, 1976**) lets the Union deploy the armed forces and CAPFs in any State in aid of the civil power, a matter the same amendment took out of the State's public-order entry. Criminal law and procedure are Concurrent, which is why the **Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita** and its companion codes, in force from 1 July **2024**, apply nationwide (Chapter 2).

In practice the scheme runs on cooperation and money. The Union deploys CAPFs on request, funds police modernisation and Security Related Expenditure, runs the Intelligence Bureau's Multi-Agency Centre with State counterparts, and investigates scheduled offences through the National Investigation Agency (Act of **2008**, widened **2019**) without needing State consent. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission's fifth report, *Public Order (2007)*, set the standard: professional State police, a Union that supports rather than supplants, courts that deliver. The Inter-State Council, the Zonal Councils and the DGP/IGP conference manage the friction. The Union's weight shows in the Home Ministry's budget for **2026-27: ₹2,55,234 crore**, **68** per cent of it for police, **₹1,16,789 crore** of that for the seven CAPFs.

PROVISION	WHAT IT SAYS	WHY IT MATTERS
List II, Entries 1–2	Public order and police are State subjects	Policing quality, the root of most outcomes, is a State responsibility
Article 355	Union's duty to protect States against external aggression and internal disturbance	Sarkaria (1988) and Punchhi (2010): deployment possible even without a State's request, after consultation
List I, Entry 2A	Deployment of armed forces and CAPFs in aid of civil power	Footing for CRPF, BSF and Army deployments; special powers need a disturbed-area law (Chapter 30)
Article 356	President's Rule on failure of constitutional machinery	Checked by <i>S.R. Bommai</i> (1994); Manipur, 13 Feb 2025 to 4 Feb 2026
Article 352	Emergency on war, external aggression or armed rebellion	"Internal disturbance" replaced by "armed rebellion" (44th Amendment, 1978)
List III, Entries 1–3	Criminal law, procedure, preventive detention for public order	Uniform codes (BNS, BNSS, BSA); Union law prevails on repugnancy (Art 254)

The Constitutional Scheme: Who Is Responsible for Internal Security?

Public order and police belong to the States; the Union carries a duty to protect every State and holds the levers of forces, agencies, money and emergency powers.




Fig. 1.2 Who is responsible for what: States as first responders, the shared criminal law, and the Union's duty, forces and agencies, with the mechanisms that join them in practice.

03 Why India Faces So Many Threats

Few countries confront so many kinds of threat at the same time. The causes are structural and they interact. Read them as a triad: **grievance** that supplies recruits and sympathy, **opportunity** in terrain, borders and weak governance, and **capacity** in money, arms, sanctuary and technology, much of it from outside.

- **Poverty and inequality:** the poorest forest districts were the Maoist heartland.
- **Youth and jobs:** a large cohort with thin prospects is every movement's recruiting pool.
- **Uneven development:** extraction without local gain; displacement without rehabilitation.
- **Corruption and the crime-politics nexus:** described by the Vohra Committee (1993); it hollows out the State where it is weakest.
- **Slow justice:** about 5.64 crore cases pending in July 2026; low conviction makes crime a low-risk trade.
- **Faultlines:** religion, caste, ethnicity, language and region, each open to mobilisation and rumour.
- **Hostile, unstable neighbours:** a proxy war with Pakistan; an unsettled 3,488-km Line of Actual Control; Afghanistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh in flux.
- **Terrain and borders:** 15,106.7 km of land border with seven countries; a 11,098.81-km coastline.
- **Technology:** encryption, drones, crypto-currency and deepfakes give small groups the reach of States.

04 The Threat Landscape in 2026

The Home Ministry's Annual Report 2024-25 still sorts internal security into four theatres: hinterland terrorism, Left-Wing Extremism, North-East insurgency and cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. All four are at or near historic lows. Jammu and Kashmir closed 2025 with 92 fatalities (28 civilians, 17 security personnel, 46 terrorists), the lowest in over two decades even after the Pahalgam attack of 22 April. The North-East recorded 151 insurgency incidents and 6 civilian deaths in 2025, the fewest in 25 years and 82 per cent below 2014, most of them in Manipur. Left-Wing Extremism fell from 1,936 incidents and 1,005 deaths in 2010 to 234 incidents and 100 deaths in 2025; a review on 27 March 2026 left two districts "LWE-affected", and by July none was, though 37 "legacy and thrust" districts and one "district of concern" stay under watch.

THEATRE OR DOMAIN	NATURE OF THE THREAT	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	LATEST INDICATOR
Jammu and Kashmir (Ch 7-8)	Cross-border terrorism, infiltration, narco-terror	LeT/TRF, JeM and fronts; handlers in Pakistan	92 deaths in 2025; 6 infiltration bids on the LoC
North-East (Ch 9-10)	Ethnic insurgency, extortion, arms and drugs from Myanmar	Manipur factions; NSCN groups; ULFA-I	151 incidents in 2025, mostly Manipur
Central India (Ch 11-13)	Maoist insurgency, now residual	CPI (Maoist) remnants	Zero "LWE-affected" districts by mid-2026
Hinterland (Ch 3-6, 14-16)	Small modules, gangster-terror nexus, communal and mob violence	ISIS-inspired cells, Khalistan networks, gangs	Red Fort blast, 10 Nov 2025; GTI 2026 rank 13
Borders and coasts (Ch 17, 20-21)	Drones, smuggling, migration, grey-zone pressure on the LAC	Smuggling syndicates; State actors	250+ drones a year on the Punjab border

THEATRE OR DOMAIN	NATURE OF THE THREAT	PRINCIPAL ACTORS	LATEST INDICATOR
Cyberspace and media (Ch 22-25)	Fraud, intrusions, disinformation, radicalisation	Scam compounds, hacktivists, State-linked groups	24 lakh fraud complaints, ₹22,495 crore lost in 2025
Economic security (Ch 26-27)	Money laundering, counterfeit currency, terror finance	Hawala networks, shell firms, crypto mixers	FATF evaluation of India, Sept 2024: "regular follow-up"

India's Threat Landscape, 2026: A Schematic Map (Blocks, Not Boundaries)

Three classical theatres have shrunk to historic lows; the border belts, the coasts and cyberspace now carry the growing share of risk. Figures: MHA, MoD, SATP, I4C.

J&K: CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM LoC + IB 2025: 92 fatalities, lowest in over two decades; 35 fatal incidents Foreign terrorists now dominate; one local recruit in 2025 Shift to Jammu hills; Pahalgam 22 Apr 2025 (Ch 8)	PUNJAB-RAJASTHAN: THE DRONE BELT 3,323 km BSF: 21 drones (2022), 107 (2023), 250+ a year in 2024 and 2025 Heroin, pistols, grenades dropped behind the fence Narco-terror and gangster networks (Ch 6, 16)	NORTH-EAST: INSURGENCY, ETHNIC STRIFE Act East 2025: 151 incidents, 6 civilians killed; down 82% on 2014 Manipur since 3 May 2023 drives most violence (Ch 10) Myanmar border 1,643 km: FMR scrapped Feb 2024
CHINA FRONT: LAC AND GREY ZONE LAC 3,488 km LAC; Depsang-Demchok disengagement Oct 2024 Dual-use villages, dams, cyber probes, map claims Vibrant Villages, roads, tunnels (Ch 18, 20)	HINTERLAND: MODULES AND MOBS Urban CT Small online-radicalised modules; Red Fort blast 10 Nov 2025 (Ch 4) Communal, caste and mob violence; agitations (Ch 14-15) Gangster-terror nexus; organised crime (Ch 16)	LWE BELT: FROM 126 DISTRICTS TO ZERO Bastar 2025: 234 incidents, 100 deaths; 2,337 surrenders By July 2026: no district 'LWE-affected'; 37 'legacy' Relapse risk, rehabilitation, governance (Ch 11-13)
COASTS, ISLANDS AND THE BANGLADESH BORDER - Coastline 11,098.81 km (re-measured 2024); drug landings on the Gujarat-Kerala arc; fishermen; Sri Lanka strait - Bangladesh 4,096.7 km: riverine gaps, cattle and narcotics smuggling, migration; post-Aug 2024 flux (Ch 17, 20, 21)	CYBERSPACE: THE THREAT WITHOUT A THEATRE 24 lakh cyber-fraud complaints and Rs 22,495 crore reported lost in 2025 (I4C); 'digital arrest' scams, mule accounts - Critical infrastructure probes, deepfakes, hacktivism around Operation Sindoor; encrypted recruitment (Ch 22-25)	

Schematic only: tiles are placed roughly by direction and are not to scale.

Fig. 1.3 India's threat landscape as a schematic block map: the three classical theatres, the drone belt, the China front, the hinterland, the coasts and the cyber domain, with the latest figures.

What has grown is less visible. Cyber-fraud complaints rose from **2.6** lakh in **2021** to **24** lakh in **2025**, many run from scam compounds in South-East Asia staffed by trafficked Indians. Drones became the courier of choice for arms and heroin. Communal and caste flashpoints, rumour-driven lynching and agitations that turn violent remain the commonest demands on the police (Chapters 14–15). The Global Terrorism Index **2026** placed India **13th** of **163** countries, up from **14th**, while Pakistan ranked first for the first time: the neighbourhood's instability is India's exposure.

05

Grey-Zone and New-Age Threats

CONCEPT: GREY ZONE, HYBRID AND NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS

The **grey zone** is the space between peace and declared war in which a State pursues its aims by deniable, cumulative means: proxies, disinformation, cyber intrusions, economic coercion, map

claims, salami-slicing on a frontier. A **hybrid threat** combines several of these, by State and non-State hands at once, and targets a society's cohesion as much as its territory. **Non-traditional threats** (pandemics, climate shocks, mass fraud) are not hostile by design but strain the same institutions. **None** triggers a conventional military response; the answer has to come from policing, intelligence, regulation, diplomacy and resilient citizens together.

The Grey Zone: Hostile Action Below the Threshold of War

Adversaries now compete through deniable, cumulative pressure. Each instrument has an Indian counter, but the whole works only when they are joined up.

Pahalgam 22 Apr 2025 crossed this line; Operation Sindoor 7-10 May 2025 answered it (Ch 8)




Fig. 1.4 The grey zone between competition and open conflict: six instruments used against India and the counter that exists for each.

India met the full spectrum in **2025**. The Pahalgam attack and **Operation Sindoor** (7–10 May) briefly took the contest with Pakistan above the grey zone, with drones, missiles and an information war fought alongside (Chapter 8). Below that threshold the pressure never stopped. The Border Security Force recovered **107** drones on the Punjab border in **2023** and more than **250** in each of **2024** and **2025**, and the Defence Ministry counted **863** drone intrusions along the western international border in **2025**. Deepfakes and bot networks worked on communal faultlines, and hacktivists claimed intrusions during the May conflict. Dual-use villages, dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo and renamed places in Arunachal Pradesh kept the LAC contest alive without a shot; export curbs on rare earths turned supply chains into security questions. Further out lie jamming of satellite navigation, cuts to undersea data cables, and AI tools that make radicalising and defrauding cheap at scale.

06 How the Threats Interlock

Treating each theatre as a separate file is the oldest weakness in Indian internal security. Money, arms, people, data and grievance move between the threats: narcotics pay for terrorism, hawala moves the proceeds, gangs supply couriers, cyberspace supplies recruits and anonymity, governance deficits supply sympathy, and an external sponsor supplies training, sanctuary and a narrative. Most of these flows enter through the borders, which is why border management is inseparable from internal security: infiltration and arms across the Line of Control, migration and counterfeit currency across the riverine Bangladesh border, insurgent sanctuaries and synthetic drugs across the Myanmar border, terror transit and fake notes over the

open Nepal frontier, and explosives and narcotics by sea, as the Mumbai blasts of **1993** and the attacks of **2008** showed. Left-Wing Extremism, communal violence and online radicalisation are the exceptions that grow mainly from within. The Punjab drone corridor is the current lesson.

How the Threats Interlock: One Network, Many Faces

No threat stands alone. Money, arms, people, data and grievance move between them, which is why a single-agency, single-theatre response keeps failing.




Fig. 1.5 One network with many faces: the eight domains that feed armed violence and each other, and three real chains that show the flows in practice.

CASE IN POINT: THE PUNJAB DRONE CORRIDOR

The first Pakistan-origin drone drop in Punjab was detected in **2019**. By **2024** the BSF was recovering close to **300** drones a year on the **553**-km Punjab frontier, mostly small quadcopters carrying half a kilogram of heroin or a pistol to couriers waiting behind the fence. From there the chain runs to a gang, with proceeds returning through hawala, part of which investigators have traced to terror fronts. The response has had to be as layered as the threat: **23** anti-drone systems on the western border that jam, spoof or take over rogue drones; a drone forensics laboratory in Amritsar that reads each machine's flight log to map hot-spots; a School of Drone Warfare at the BSF Academy; and joint operations with the Punjab Police. Heroin seizures still reached **380** kg in **2025**. The corridor is a narcotics, border, terror-finance, organised-crime and technology problem at once, and no single agency owns it.

07

Internal Security Policy: The Aspects

An internal security policy is a set of choices across several fields at once. The Indian approach, visible in the National Policy and Action Plan on Left-Wing Extremism (**2015**) and the counter-terrorism strategy of **2026**, treats security and development as inseparable and keeps dialogue open to those who give up arms.

- **Political:** negotiate legitimate demands within the Constitution; accords, autonomy, elections (Chapters 9–10).
- **Socio-economic:** roads, schools, banks, rights and entitlements; rehabilitation of surrendered cadres.

- **Law enforcement:** SMART policing, modernisation, forensics, special forces (Chapter 2).
- **Governance:** service delivery and clean administration, so the State is present before the insurgent is.
- **Centre-State coordination:** MAC and State MACs, Unified Commands, Zonal Councils, the IB's annual National Security Strategies Conference.
- **Intelligence:** human and technical collection, fusion through MAC and NATGRID, timely action (Chapter 29).
- **Cyber and information:** CERT-In, NCIIPC, I4C, fact-checking and lawful blocking (Chapters 22–24).
- **Border management:** one border, one force; fencing, technology, Vibrant Villages (Chapters 20–21).

The interests served are the territory and the constitutional order, the democratic and plural values the Constitution protects, and a neighbourhood that exports less threat. The central agencies most often involved are listed below (Chapters 28–29 treat them in full).

AGENCY	UNDER	MANDATE IN BRIEF
Intelligence Bureau (1887)	MHA	Internal intelligence and counter-intelligence; hosts the Multi-Agency Centre
R&AW (1968)	Cabinet Secretariat	External intelligence, including cross-border terror
NTRO (2004)	NSA / NSCS	Technical intelligence: satellites, signals, cyber
NIA (2008)	MHA	Scheduled offences: terrorism, terror finance, FICN, cyber-terror, trafficking
CBI (1963)	DoPT	Corruption and special crimes; India's Interpol National Central Bureau
ED and FIU-IND	Finance	Money laundering, foreign-exchange offences; financial intelligence
NCB (1986)	MHA	Narcotics enforcement; anchors the four-tier NCORD mechanism
I4C (2020)	MHA	Cybercrime coordination: reporting portal, 1930 helpline, suspect registry
NATGRID (beta 2020; operational 2021-22)	MHA	Links 11 central agencies and State police to 11 data providers

Insecurity has costs that justify the effort: it deters investment and empties tourist economies, as Jammu and Kashmir learnt again after April 2025; it hollows out representation (a 7.14 per cent turnout in the Srinagar by-election of 2017, against about 64 per cent in the 2024 Assembly election); and it breeds fear and displacement, from the Kashmiri Pandit exodus of 1990 to the camps of Manipur.

The National Security Strategy Debate

India's apex structure dates from **1998**: a **National Security Council** chaired by the Prime Minister, served by the National Security Adviser, a Strategic Policy Group, a National Security Advisory Board of outside experts and the Joint Intelligence Committee, all supported by the **National Security Council Secretariat**. The Secretariat now has cyber and maritime security coordinators, an Additional NSA (post created July **2024**) and three Deputy NSAs; the Advisory Board was reconstituted in April **2025** under a former R&AW chief. Above it the Cabinet Committee on Security decides.

What India has never done is publish a **National Security Strategy**: a periodic statement of interests, threats, priorities and the resources and institutions to match. The Kargil Review Committee (**1999**), the Group of Ministers (**2001**) and the Naresh Chandra Task Force (**2012**) each asked for one; drafts and committees followed, and the Chief of Defence Staff said in November **2024** that a written document was under preparation. As of October **2026** it has **not** appeared. The official view, stated by General Anil Chauhan as CDS in **2024** and in his **2025** book, is that strategy lives in policy, processes and structures, as the decisions of August **2019** showed. Critics answer that an unwritten strategy cannot be debated in Parliament, cannot anchor theatre-command or acquisition reform, and leaves agencies to set their own priorities; the United States has published one under law since **1986**, Britain and Japan publish theirs, and even Pakistan issued a public National Security Policy for **2022–26**.

A Strategy Without a Strategy Document: The National Security Strategy Question, 1999–2026

Every review since Kargil has asked for a written strategy. Institutions and sectoral documents have multiplied; the overarching public NSS has not appeared.




Fig. 1.6 The National Security Strategy question from the Kargil Review Committee to the sectoral strategies of 2026: what exists, what is still missing, and the official view.

IN THE NEWS 2026: THREE STRATEGY DOCUMENTS, STILL NO STRATEGY DOCUMENT

Within seven months India published more strategic text than in the previous decade. On 23 February **2026** the Home Ministry released **PRAHAAR**, the first National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, on seven pillars: prevention; swift, proportionate response; whole-of-government capacity; human-rights and rule-of-law based processes; attenuating the conditions that enable terrorism, including radicalisation; shaping international efforts; and whole-of-society recovery and resilience. On 10 March the Defence Minister released **Defence Forces Vision 2047**, an Integrated Defence

Staff roadmap in three phases to **2047** that proposes space and cyber commands, a drone force and a cognitive-warfare force. On 3 September came **RAKSHA**, a ten-year defence diplomacy framework. In August the Home Minister told the ninth National Security Strategies Conference to become predictive rather than reactive and anticipate threats **15–20** years ahead. Each is a piece of a national strategy; the whole remains unwritten.

09

Limitations and the Way Forward

The present approach has delivered results, but its weaknesses are old. It is **reactive**: reforms follow shocks, from Kargil to Mumbai **2008** to Pahalgam. It is **fragmented**: intelligence agencies work without statutory charters or parliamentary oversight (Chapter 29), and the proposed National Counter-Terrorism Centre never came into being. It leans on the **Centre's forces**: States call for CAPFs rather than build their own police, so a force of about **10.5** lakh with **8** per cent vacancies is permanently stretched, while **station-level policing** stays under-staffed and politically exposed and **justice** slow. The **human cost** of hard measures, from preventive detention to internet shutdowns, feeds the alienation that security is meant to end; and **technology** outruns law, procurement and training.

- **Publish a National Security Strategy** with a classified core and a public summary, reviewed every five years.
- **Police reform first**: implement *Prakash Singh* (**2006**), fill vacancies, professionalise investigation and forensics.
- **Prevention over reaction**: early warning, de-radicalisation, community policing; citizens, border villagers and fishermen as first sensors.
- **Cooperative federalism**: joint planning, shared data, agreed rules for CAPF deployment.
- **Accountable agencies**: charters for IB and R&AW, oversight committees, time-bound trials under special laws.
- **Technology with safeguards**: anti-drone grids, AI analytics and cyber commandos within the DPDP Act and judicial review.
- **Development after security**: consolidate cleared areas with roads, schools, land rights and jobs so they do not relapse.

India's record since **2014** shows that patient, coordinated pressure can end insurgencies; the next decade will test whether the same can be done to threats that have no theatre at all.

USING THIS CHAPTER IN MAINS

Open by separating internal from external security and showing how they merge in proxy war, drones and cyberspace; Kautilya or the Lohia circles add depth. Ground any Centre–State point in the State List, Article 355 and Entry 2A. For a "challenges" question, use the 2026 figures and then show the linkages, which is where the best answers earn their keep. On policy, name the aspects, cite PRAHAAR and the NSS debate, and close with a way forward that balances capacity with rights.

Chapter 1 at a Glance




Fig. 1.7 Chapter 1 at a glance: the whole chapter on one page for quick revision.



Previous Year Questions

2013

GS III · 10 MARKS

How far are India's internal security challenges linked with border management particularly in view of the long porous borders with most countries of South Asia and Myanmar ?

Approach: Open with the linkage: 15,106.7 km of land border with seven neighbours and an 11,098.81-km coastline are the gateway for most threats. Go border by border: LoC infiltration and drones in Punjab (250+ a year), migration and FICN across the riverine Bangladesh border, insurgent camps and synthetic drugs across Myanmar (FMR scrapped 2024), terror transit over the open Nepal frontier, sea routes of 1993 and 26/11. Note the limits: LWE, communal violence and radicalisation are largely home-grown. Conclude with one-border-one-force, smart fencing, anti-drone grids, Vibrant Villages and coastal security. (Sections 03, 04, 06, 07)

LOTUSARISE IAS

UNIT III

2 CHAPTERS

Jammu and Kashmir

Role of external state and non-state actors in creating challenges to internal security — the history of Jammu and Kashmir, Article 370 and the 2019 reorganisation, and the proxy war from 1989 to Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor.

CHAPTERS

07	Jammu and Kashmir: History, Article 370 and the 2019 Reorganisation	75
08	Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir: Proxy War, Pahalgam, Operation Sindoor and the Way Forward	86

TOPICS COVERED IN THIS UNIT

07 Jammu and Kashmir: History, Article 370 and the 2019 Reorganisation

From Kingdom to Accession, 1846–1947 · The UN, the LoC and Pakistan · Articles 370 and 35A Before 2019 · Separatism and Political Fault Lines · The 2019 Reorganisation · The Supreme Court Verdict of 2023 · Delimitation, Elections and Statehood · Ladakh: Strategy, Safeguards, Unrest · Winning Hearts on the Frontier · Assessment and Way Forward

08 Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir: Proxy War, Pahalgam, Operation Sindoor and the Way Forward

Origins: From Revolt to Proxy War · How the Proxy War Works · After 2019: Trends and the Jammu Shift · Pahalgam, 22 April 2025 · Operation Sindoor, 7–10 May 2025 · The "New Normal" Doctrine · The Response on the Ground · Rights, Trust and Their Critics · The Way Forward

INTERNAL SECURITY

MAINS · GS PAPER III

Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir: Proxy War, Pahalgam, Operation Sindoor and the Way Forward

On the afternoon of 22 April 2025, terrorists walked into the Baisaran meadow above Pahalgam and killed 26 people, 25 of them tourists, after singling them out by religion. Fifteen days later Indian missiles struck nine terrorist sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and for four days the two nuclear-armed neighbours exchanged drones, missiles and artillery fire before agreeing to stop. Yet the same year ended with the fewest conflict deaths in Jammu and Kashmir in more than two decades. This chapter explains that paradox.

SYLLABUS

PRELIMS

Current events of national and international importance

MAINS · GS PAPER III

Role of external state and non-state actors in creating challenges to internal security; Security challenges and their management in border areas - linkages of organized crime with terrorism; Various Security forces and agencies and their mandate

CONTENTS

01	Origins: From Revolt to Proxy War	02	How the Proxy War Works
03	After 2019: Trends and the Jammu Shift	04	Pahalgam, 22 April 2025
05	Operation Sindoor, 7–10 May 2025	06	The "New Normal" Doctrine
07	The Response on the Ground	08	Rights, Trust and Their Critics
09	The Way Forward	10	Previous Year Questions

This chapter covers:

- the origins and working of the proxy war, including over-ground workers;
- phases from 1989 to 2019 and the trends since 2019;
- the Pahalgam attack and the measures that followed;

- Operation Sindoor and the "new normal" doctrine;
- the security, legal and hearts-and-minds response;
- rights concerns and the way forward.

The history, Article 370 and Ladakh are in Chapter 7; terror finance in Chapter 6; Pakistan and China as state actors in Chapter 18; AFSPA in Chapter 30.

01 Origins: From Revolt to Proxy War

Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir began in **1988–89**, when grievances sharpened by the widely disputed Assembly election of **1987** met an opportunity across the border. As the Afghan war ended, Pakistan's army and intelligence services, by India's consistent account and the findings of many investigations, turned to a **proxy war**: arming, training and directing militants instead of a fourth war. The first wave was led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which wanted independence; Pakistan's intelligence agency soon shifted support to groups that wanted merger with Pakistan or a pan-Islamist goal, first the **Hizbul Mujahideen** (**1989**), then the Pakistan-based **Lashkar-e-Taiba** and, after the hijacked IC-814 passengers were exchanged for three jailed terrorists in **1999**, the **Jaish-e-Mohammed**. The cost was heavy: SATP counted over **4,000** deaths in **2001** alone, and from **1990** most Kashmiri Pandits fled the Valley; more than **60,000** families remain registered as migrants.

Five Phases of Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, 1989–2026

Each phase changed who fought, how, and how the State answered. Peak annual deaths from SATP data (since 2000).




Fig. 8.1 Five phases of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, 1989–2026, with the turning points that defined each.

The phases followed one another as each side adapted. The mass uprising of the early **1990s** gave way after **1996** to foreign-led *fidayeen* raids, the Kargil intrusion, the attack on the J&K Assembly and Parliament in **2001** and a ten-month military stand-off (Operation Parakram). The LoC fence and the ceasefire of November **2003** cut infiltration; violence fell, though the street unrest of **2008** and **2010** showed anger moving from the gun to the crowd. Burhan Wani's death in July **2016** revived local recruitment through social media; the Uri attack drew the first cross-LoC strikes, and the Pulwama bombing of February **2019** the first air strike across the international border since **1971**.

How the Proxy War Works

The sponsor's logic is a low-intensity conflict: keep violence below the threshold of war, deny involvement, and let local grievance supply legitimacy. Its instruments have changed with each counter-measure.

- **Infiltration:** trained cadres cross the LoC or the Jammu international border through launch pads, tunnels and riverine gaps, often under covering fire.
- **Over-ground workers:** the support network that hides, feeds, guides and finances fighters (box below).
- **Hybrid terrorists:** part-timers with no police record who strike once and return to ordinary life.
- **Front names:** "The Resistance Front" (TRF) for Lashkar, and the "People's Anti-Fascist Front" and "Kashmir Tigers" for Jaish, giving foreign-run groups a local face.
- **Crowds and shutdowns:** stone-pelting and hartals to tie down forces and win headlines (common in **2008–2019**; none recorded in **2025**).
- **Money and arms:** hawala, narcotics and cross-LoC trade (suspended **2019**), and drones dropping weapons near Jammu and Punjab (Chapter 6).
- **Information war:** encrypted apps for handlers, social media for recruitment and glorification.

CONCEPT: OVER-GROUND WORKERS (OGWS)

Over-ground workers are the unarmed supporters of armed groups: they shelter and feed militants, carry messages, scout targets, move cash and weapons, recruit youth, organise crowds and spread propaganda. Each active militant depends on several, which is why "neutralising the ecosystem" became a goal after **2019**. The ban on the **Jamaat-e-Islami** of J&K under the UAPA in February **2019**, extended in **2024**, was justified by the Government as cutting an ideological and logistical base. Tools against OGWs are listed in Section 07. **Blanket** detention, however, risks creating the very sympathisers it targets.

Anatomy of the Proxy War: From Sponsor to Strike

Five links in the chain (top) and the counter for each (bottom). The over-ground network is the link that makes the others work.





Fig. 8.2 The proxy-war chain from sponsor to attack, the role of the over-ground network, and where each link can be broken.

After 2019: Trends and the Jammu Shift

Violence has fallen steeply since the reorganisation of **2019**. SATP data show conflict deaths of **452** in **2018**, **253** in **2022**, **127** in **2024** and **92** in **2025** (**28** civilians, **17** security personnel, **46** terrorists), with **22** more by mid-October **2026**. Local recruitment, once the engine of "new-age militancy" after Burhan Wani's death in **2016**, fell to a single recruit in **2025**, so most of those still active are **foreign terrorists**, better trained and harder to track.

Fewer Deaths, a New Map: Jammu and Kashmir, 2018–2025

Conflict deaths by category (SATP). Totals fell by four-fifths; attacks moved south of the Pir Panjal into the Jammu region.



THE JAMMU SHIFT, 2021–2025

- Oct 2021 Poonch-Rajouri ambushes; 9 soldiers killed
- Jan 2023 Dhangri, Rajouri: 7 civilians killed
- Apr–May 2023 Poonch and Rajouri: 10 soldiers
- Jun 2024 Reasi: pilgrim bus ambushed, 9 killed
- Jul 2024 Kathua and Doda ambushes on troops
- Apr 2025 Pahalgam: the Valley again, 26 killed

Why there: dense Pir Panjal forest, older routes, thinner troops after 2020 moves to Ladakh.

Fig. 8.3 Conflict deaths in Jammu and Kashmir by category, 2018–2025 (SATP), and the main attacks that marked the shift to the Jammu region.

Two patterns cut against the trend. First, **targeted killings** of Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs, migrant workers and local police in **2021–22** aimed to undo the return of minorities. Second, groups moved south into the forested **Pir Panjal and Chenab belt** of the Jammu region (Rajouri, Poonch, Reasi, Kathua, Doda, Kishtwar), quiet since the mid-**2000s**. Seven civilians were killed at Dhangri (Rajouri) in January **2023**, nine pilgrims when a bus was ambushed near Reasi in June **2024**, and soldiers in a series of ambushes in Poonch, Kathua and Doda in **2023–24**. Thinner troop density after deployments to Ladakh in **2020**, dense forest and older infiltration routes explain the shift; the response was more troops, revived Village Defence Guards and new counter-infiltration grids.




Fig. 8.4 The Pir Panjal range: its forested southern slopes in Rajouri, Poonch and Reasi became the new theatre after 2021.

Pahalgam, 22 April 2025

The attack at Baisaran was the deadliest on civilians in India since Mumbai in **2008**. The Resistance Front claimed it the same day and again the next, then retracted the claim on 26 April; Pakistan denied any involvement. In its briefing to the Cabinet Committee on Security, the Government said the attack had "cross-border linkages" and was timed to derail the Union Territory's return to elections and growth. On 23 April the

CCS announced five measures. In the Valley the attack drew rare public condemnation: shops and businesses shut in protest, and a local pony operator was among those killed while trying to stop the attackers.

CCS DECISION, 23 APRIL 2025	WHAT IT MEANT
Indus Waters Treaty (1960) held in abeyance	"Until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism"
Integrated Check Post Attari closed	The only open land crossing shut; return allowed till 1 May
SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme ended for Pakistani nationals	Existing SVES visas cancelled; holders given 48 hours to leave
Defence, naval and air advisers declared persona non grata	India's own advisers withdrawn from Islamabad; posts annulled
High Commissions cut from 55 to 30 staff	To be effected by 1 May 2025

The treaty decision was the most consequential. India stopped sharing river data through the treaty's commission (a flood alert in August **2025** went through diplomatic channels) and moved to speed up storage and power projects on the Chenab. Pakistan called any diversion of water an "act of war" and turned to the Court of Arbitration, which India has never recognised; on 31 August **2026** that court declared the treaty "fully in force" and limited work on the Rattle project, and the Ministry of External Affairs replied that the court had no jurisdiction and that the abeyance remained in force (Chapter 18).



Fig. 8.5 The Chenab rail bridge in Reasi district, opened in 2025 on the line to the Valley. The Chenab is also central to the Indus treaty dispute.

The investigation moved in parallel. The NIA arrested two local men in June **2025** for sheltering the attackers. In July, in **Operation Mahadev** in the Dachigam forest near Srinagar, the Army, CRPF and J&K Police killed three Pakistani terrorists whom the Home Minister told Parliament were the Pahalgam attackers. On 15 December **2025** the NIA filed a **1,597**-page chargesheet naming Lashkar-e-Taiba/TRF as an organisation, a Pakistan-based handler, the three slain attackers and the two harbourers; a supplementary chargesheet in July **2026** added the Lashkar chief. The United States designated TRF a Foreign Terrorist Organisation in July **2025**, and the UN 1267 Monitoring Team's report that month mentioned TRF's claims for the first time (Chapter 6).

05

Operation Sindoor, 7–10 May 2025

Between **1.05** and **1.30** am on 7 May, the armed forces struck nine sites, four in Pakistan (including the Jaish headquarters at Bahawalpur and the Lashkar complex at Muridke) and five in PoK. The Foreign Secretary described the strikes as "measured, non-escalatory, proportionate and responsible", aimed at terrorist infrastructure and at pre-empting further attacks that intelligence said were impending; the Defence Ministry stressed that no Pakistani military facility had been targeted.

From Pahalgam to the Ceasefire Understanding, April–May 2025

Sequence as given in official Indian briefings (CCS, MEA, MoD, DGMOs, PM's address).




Fig. 8.6 From Pahalgam to the ceasefire understanding: the sequence of April–May 2025 as described in official Indian briefings.

Pakistan answered with shelling along the LoC, heaviest in Poonch, which killed Indian civilians, and with waves of drones and missiles against military bases and towns from Jammu to Gujarat on the nights of 7–8 and 8–9 May. According to the official briefings, India's integrated air defence intercepted them, India hit air-defence radars and systems, including one at Lahore, and on 9–10 May hit **11** Pakistani air bases and military sites, among them Nur Khan, Rafiqui, Sargodha, Bholari and Jacobabad. On the afternoon of 10 May Pakistan's Director General of Military Operations called his Indian counterpart, and the two agreed to stop all firing and military action on land, air and sea from **5** pm. India has maintained that this understanding was reached directly between the DGMOs, rejecting US claims of mediation. At the briefing of 11 May the DGMOs said more than **100** terrorists had been killed in the first strikes, including men linked to the IC-814 hijacking and the Pulwama bombing, that Pakistan had lost about **35–40** soldiers on the LoC, and that five Indian soldiers had died. The CCS measures against Pakistan stayed in force, and the Government has described the operation as suspended, not ended. A parallel information war, with fabricated videos and false claims of Indian losses, was countered by PIB Fact Check and the blocking of thousands of accounts (Chapter 24).

The air war was the first between the two countries fought largely with stand-off weapons, drones and long-range air defence. On 11 May the Director General of Air Operations said that "losses are a part of combat" and that all Indian pilots were back; on 31 May the Chief of Defence Staff acknowledged early aircraft losses without giving a number, called Pakistan's claim of six Indian jets "absolutely incorrect", and said tactics were corrected within two days; in August the Air Chief said at least five Pakistani fighters and one large aircraft had been shot down, mostly by the S-400 system. The lessons drove orders for air defence, counter-drone systems and long-range munitions.

CASE IN POINT: THE DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN AFTER SINDOOR

India paired force with diplomacy: seven all-party delegations visited **33** countries in late May and June **2025**. The attack was condemned in the UN Security Council's press statement of 25 April, by the FATF in June, in the Quad foreign ministers' statement of 1 July, the BRICS declaration of 6 July and the SCO's Tianjin Declaration of 1 September **2025**, which Pakistan also signed. In June India

refused to sign an SCO defence ministers' text that omitted Pahalgam. After a strike, the narrative battle is won in communiqués too.

06

The "New Normal" Doctrine

In his address of 12 May **2025** the Prime Minister called Operation Sindoor India's "policy against terrorism" and set out three principles: any terrorist attack will get a befitting reply on India's own terms, striking wherever the roots of terror lie; India will **not** tolerate nuclear blackmail; and **India will make no distinction between terrorists and the governments that sponsor them**. He added that "terror and talks", "terror and trade", and "water and blood" cannot go together, and that any talks with Pakistan will be only on terrorism and PoK.

Climbing the Ladder: India's Responses to Cross-Border Terror, 2016–2025

Each response went deeper and wider than the last. The 12 May 2025 address turned the pattern into declared policy.

NON-MILITARY STEPS ALONGSIDE

2016: diplomatic isolation. 2019: MFN status withdrawn, 200% duty. 2025: Indus treaty in abeyance, Attari shut, visas cancelled, missions cut to 30.

2016

Surgical strikes

After Uri: special forces hit launch pads across the LoC

2019

Balakot air strike

After Pulwama: air strike on a JeM camp inside Pakistan; air clash next day

2025

Operation Sindoor

After Pahalgam: nine sites in Pakistan and PoK; four days; 11 air bases; DGMO understanding

THE THREE PRINCIPLES (12 MAY 2025)

- 1 A befitting reply, on India's terms, at the roots of terror
- 2 No tolerance for nuclear blackmail
- 3 No distinction between terrorists and their state sponsors

Also stated: talks with Pakistan only on terrorism and PoK; 'terror and talks', 'water and blood' cannot go together.

DEBATE: deterrence restored vs escalation risk; each round sets a higher bar for the next.

depth, scale and duration of response

Fig. 8.7 The escalation ladder of India's responses since 2016 and the three principles announced on 12 May 2025.

BASIS	SURGICAL STRIKES, 2016	BALAKOT, 2019	OPERATION SINDOOR, 2025
Trigger	Uri camp attack (19 soldiers)	Pulwama bombing (40 CRPF)	Pahalgam (26 civilians)
Means	Special forces across the LoC	Air strike on a camp in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Joint missile and air strikes; drone and air-defence battle
Depth	Launch pads near the LoC	One target inside Pakistan	Nine targets, up to Bahawalpur; later 11 air bases
Duration	One night	Strike and a dogfight next day	Four days, ending in a DGMO understanding

Supporters see restored deterrence: sponsoring an attack now invites strikes deep inside Pakistan. Analysts note the risks: each round has climbed higher on the escalation ladder, a doctrine that ties retaliation to any attack can hand the initiative to whoever carries one out, and false claims on all sides complicate de-escalation. Defence reviews since **2025** have stressed air defence, drones, long-range fires and jointness, and the Defence Forces Vision **2047** (March **2026**) builds on them.

07

The Response on the Ground

Inside Jammu and Kashmir the response works in three layers. The **security grid** is run through the Unified Headquarters under the Lieutenant Governor, joining the Army (with the Rashtriya Rifles), the CRPF, BSF and the J&K Police's Special Operations Group; **Operation All-Out (2017)** targeted listed commanders, and a multi-tier counter-infiltration grid with fencing, sensors and anti-drone systems guards the LoC, which saw only six infiltration bids in **2025**, and the Jammu border. The **legal and financial layer** uses UAPA bans, NIA terror-funding cases, attachment of property and the suspension of cross-LoC trade. The **hearts-and-minds layer** seeks to separate people from militants.

TOOL AGAINST THE SUPPORT ECOSYSTEM	LEGAL BASIS	CONCERN RAISED
Banning fronts (Jel, JKLF, Hurriyat groups)	UAPA s. 3 ; tribunal review	Curbs on political dissent
Preventive detention of OGWs and stone-pelters	J&K Public Safety Act 1978	Long detentions; habeas corpus delays
Attachment of property used for terror	UAPA s. 25 ; NDPS	Families punished for relatives' acts
Dismissal of employees linked to militancy	Article 311 (2)(c)	No inquiry or hearing
Terror-funding and hawala cases	UAPA ss. 17, 40 ; PMLA	Slow trials, low conviction

- **Development:** the Prime Minister's Development Package of **2015** (₹**80,068** crore; **39** of **53** J&K projects completed or nearly so by 2026); the industrial scheme of **2021**.
- **Outreach:** Back to Village (**2019**), Mission Youth, Himayat skilling, sports and the Army's Operation Sadbhavana (Chapter 7).
- **Democracy:** DDC polls (**2020**) and record turnouts in **2024**; Kashmiri Pandit return: **5,896** of **6,000** jobs filled, **4,112** transit flats built.
- **Village Defence Guards:** armed, paid volunteers in remote Jammu villages (scheme of **2022**), expanded after Dhangri.
- **Surrender and rehabilitation:** policies for returnees and those who renounce violence.
- **Normal life:** tourism, the Amarnath Yatra and the Kashmir rail link as symbols of a reopened Valley.

IN THE NEWS 2026: HOLDING THE LINE AFTER PAHALGAM

The attack targeted tourism, and it hurt: domestic visits fell from a record **2.3** crore in **2024** to about **1.77** crore in **2025**. Recovery has relied on security as much as marketing. The Amarnath Yatra, guarded in **2025** by about **580** CAPF companies and the Army's Operation Shiva, drew **4.14** lakh pilgrims that year and about **4.8** lakh in the **57**-day Yatra of **2026** (3 July–28 August). Along the LoC, the Defence Ministry counted **163** ceasefire violations in **2025**, **124** of them during Operation Sindoor, against two in **2024**. Conflict deaths in **2026** stood at **22** by mid-October, mostly terrorists. The challenge now is to make the calm self-sustaining rather than troop-dependent.

08

Rights, Trust and Their Critics

Security gains have come with costs that critics and courts have flagged. After August **2019** communications were cut and thousands, including former Chief Ministers, were preventively detained; in *Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India* (January **2020**) the Supreme Court held that indefinite internet suspension is impermissible and that orders must be published, necessary and proportionate, with periodic review. Long PSA and UAPA detentions, summons to journalists, Article **311(2)(c)** dismissals, the demolition of houses of alleged militants after Pahalgam and AFSPA have drawn criticism. The Government's position is that these are lawful, targeted measures against a sponsored terror ecosystem and that courts remain open. Both points can be true: lasting peace needs a population that sees the law as protection, not only as punishment.

09

The Way Forward

- **Deterrence with control:** credible response options, integrated air and drone defence, and channels that prevent accidental escalation.
- **Seal the Jammu belt:** more boots and technology in Pir Panjal forests, smart fencing, tunnel detection, VDGs with training and accountability.
- **Choke the ecosystem:** OGW mapping, narco-terror and hawala cases, FATF and UN pressure, swift NIA trials.
- **Politics:** restore statehood and local bodies so elected leaders own peace (Chapter 7).
- **Youth:** jobs, sports, mental health and counter-radicalisation online.
- **Diplomacy:** pursue TRF's UN listing, FATF scrutiny of sponsors and evidence-sharing on Pahalgam.
- **Rights:** review PSA detentions, narrow shutdowns, faster trials, compensation and reconciliation, including for displaced Pandits.

Force can deny the proxy war its targets; only trust can deny it people.

USING THIS CHAPTER IN MAINS

For causes, show grievance plus sponsorship; for OGWs or hearts and minds, list layered measures with a caution on rights. On Pahalgam and Sindoor, quote official briefings (five CCS measures, nine targets, 10 May, three principles) without adjectives.

Chapter 8 at a Glance




Fig. 8.8 Chapter 8 at a glance.



Previous Year Questions

2023

GS III · 10 MARKS

Winning of 'Hearts and Minds' in terrorism-affected areas is an essential step in restoring the trust of the population. Discuss the measures adopted by the Government in this respect as part of the conflict resolution in Jammu and Kashmir.

Approach: Trust denies militancy recruits and shelter. Measures: PMDP 2015 (Rs 80,068 crore), the 2021 industrial scheme, Back to Village, Mission Youth, Sadbhavana, DDC polls and the 2024 elections, Village Defence Guards, Pandit jobs and flats, a secure Amarnath Yatra; balance with rights concerns (Anuradha Bhasin 2020). (Sections 07, 08, 09)

2019

GS III · 10 MARKS

The banning of 'Jamaat-e-Islami' in Jammu and Kashmir brought into focus the role of over-ground workers (OGWs) in assisting terrorist organizations. Examine the role played by OGWs in assisting terrorist organizations in insurgency affected areas. Discuss measures to neutralize influence of OGWs.

Approach: Cite the Jamaat-e-Islami ban (2019, extended 2024). Define OGWs (shelter, couriers, scouting, funds, recruits, crowds, propaganda), hybrid terrorists and fronts like TRF. Measures: intelligence mapping, UAPA and PSA cases, attachment, hawala and narco-terror probes, Article 311 dismissals, youth outreach; avoid blanket detentions. (Sections 02, 07, 09)

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32

CHAPTERS

12

UNITS

59

PYQS 2013–2026

209

ORIGINAL DIAGRAMS

ALL TWELVE UNITS IN THE FULL BOOK

I	Foundations of Internal Security	2 ch · p5
II	Terrorism	4 ch · p29
III	Jammu and Kashmir	2 ch · p74
IV	North-East India	2 ch · p96
V	Left-Wing Extremism and Development	3 ch · p120
VI	Communal, Caste and Mob Violence	2 ch · p154
VII	Organised Crime, Trafficking and External Actors	4 ch · p177
VIII	Border and Coastal Security	2 ch · p222
IX	Cyber Security, Communication Networks and Media	4 ch · p246
X	Money Laundering and Economic Security	2 ch · p293
XI	Security Forces and Agencies	3 ch · p316
XII	Answer-Writing Resources	2 ch · p350



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